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GENTRIFICATION: THE CLASS CONFLICT
OVER URBAN SPACE MOVES
INTO THE COURTS
Harold A. McDougall*
I. Introduction
Gentrification' has changed the character and appearance of many
of America's older, inner-city neighborhoods.2  It has created a con-
test for living space between low income residents of those neighbor-
hoods and more affluent newcomers who have been attracted to the
city because of the relatively low price of housing and the high cost of
commuting to and from city jobs. 3 During urban renewal city gov-
* Harold A. McDougall, Associate Professor, Rutgers. The State University of New
Jersey, S.I. Newhouse Center for Law & Justice. B.A. 1967, Harvard College. J.D.
1971, Yale Law School.
1. According to Judge Leon Higginbotham, writing for the majority in Business
Ass'n of Univ. City v. Landrieu, 660 F.2d 867, 874 n.8 (3d Cir. 1981),
Gentrification is a term used in land development to describe a trend
whereby previously "underdeveloped" areas become "revitalized" as per-
sons of relative affluence invest in homes and begin to "upgrade" the
neighborhood economically. This process often causes the eviction of the
less affluent residents who can no longer afford the increasingly expensive
housing in their neighborhood. Gentrification is a deceptive term which
masks the dire consequences that "upgrading" of neighborhoods causes
when the neighborhood becomes too expensive for either rental or pur-
chase by the less affluent residents who bear the brunt of the change.
The term was coined by London planners to signify the return of the upper-middle
classes to that city. See COWLEY et al., COMMUNITY OR CLASS STRUGGLE? 131 (1977).
In the United States, the term gentrification has been used to describe the return of
managerial and professional people-particularly younger individuals-to the cen-
tral city. See, e.g., Fleetwood, The New Elite and an Urban Renaissance, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 14, 1979, § 6 (Magazine), at 16; Allman, The Urban Crisis Leaves Town,
HAwEa'S, Dec. 1978, at 41.
2. Gentrification is not limited to cities such as New York, see notes 14-125 infra
and accompanying text, Philadelphia, see notes 126-77 infra and accompanying text,
Chicago, see notes 178-231 infra and accompanying text, and Boston, see notes
232-57 infra and accompanying text. As one commentator has noted, gentrification is
"occurring in numerous census tracts, not just our glamorous cities, but in our
Cincinnatis, our Milwaukees, our Rochesters." Henig, Gentrification and Displace-
ment Within Cities: A Comparative Analysis, 61 Soc. Sci. Q. 638, 650 (1980).
3. One recent study, LeGates and Hartman, Displacement, 15 CLEARINGHOUSE
REv. 207 (1981), compared the characteristics of "inmovers" and "outmovers" in a
number of gentrified communities. Id. at 221-26. The study found that the inmovers
came mostly from other neighborhoods in the same city, not from the suburbs or
other cities. Id. at 221. Furthermore, the study concluded that the typical household
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ernments used the power of eminent domain to remove the poor from
their homes in an attempt to revitalize decaying neighborhoods and
reverse a decline in municipal tax revenues. 4 Now low income resi-
settling in a gentrifying community during the 1970's "was composed of one or two
unmarried or married young adults, without children; was white; had one or more
members employed in a professional or managerial occupation; and earned an above
average income." Id. at 223. The study found that the displacees were a more diverse
group. Id. at 225. While many outmovers interviewed were lower income, working
class whites, all races, age groups, and income levels were represented. Id. at 224-25.
As one author has stated:
Those who interpret the history of the cities through a class conflict
paradigm see in gentrification the culmination of an effort by white
upper-income and business interests, publicly supported through urban
renewal, loan subsidies and tax incentives, to regain control of the political
and economic resources that, in the rush of suburbanization, were nearly
ceded by default to a new urban majority consisting of the poor, Hispanic
and black.
Henig, supra note 2, at 649. Class conflict, however, does not always involve racial
conflict. See, e.g., King v. Harris, 446 U.S. 905 (1980) (first suit brought by NAACP
to oppose low income housing for minority groups in an already racially integrated
neighborhood). Cf. Jones v. Tully, 378 F. Supp. 286 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd sub
nom. Jones v. Meade, 510 F.2d 961 (2d Cir. 1975) (class action brought by town
residents to enjoin construction of a low and moderate income housing project on
grounds that such construction would perpetuate racial concentration).
4. See M. ANDERSON, THE FEDERAL BULLDOZER, 161-72 (1965). For example, in
1961 Governor David L. Lawrence of Pennsylvania stated:
[Urban renewal] is the central city's only hope for maintaining its eco-
nomic base, adding to its tax base, attracting to the city a cross-section of
residents of every income group ...successful urban renewal is an aston-
ishing producer of public revenues.
Id. at 161, citing Private Financing Considerations in Urban Renewal, A Report of
the Proceedings of the 6th Annual NAHRO Conference on Urban Renewal, April
16-18, 1961. See also S. GEER, URBAN RENEWAL AND AMERICAN CITIES 27-29 (1965)
(discussing the erection of malls and office buildings in previously blighted areas to
counteract declining municipal tax bases). Eminent domain was one of the primary
tools used by local governments and municipalities to clear slum areas and their
inhabitants for urban renewal. See, e.g., R. CARO, THE POWER BROKER 968 (1974)
(other methods were street closings and utility easements); W. Sogg and W.
Wertheimer, Legal and Governmental Issues in Urban Renewal, in URBAN RE-
NEWAL: THE RECORD AND THE CONTROVERSY 131 (J. Wilson ed. 1966). The first federal
urban renewal statute which provided federal aid to the cities for renewal projects
was Title I of the Housing Act of 1949, 63 Stat. 413, 414, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1441-1490h
(1976). For a discussion of the 1949 Act and its legislative history, see FOARD AND
FETTERMAN, FEDERAL URBAN RENEWAL: THE RECORD AND THE CONTROVERSY 79-103
(J. Wilson ed. 1966). Although the 1949 Act stated as its purpose the national goal of
"a decent home and a suitable living environment for every American family," 42
U.S.C. § 1441a (1976), this goal was not realized. In many instances, urban planners
and local governments ignored the Act's requirement that families being relocated
from Title I sites be placed in "decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings" and moved those
families to less adequate housing. R. CARO, THE POWER BROKER, 961-83 (1974).
Some places were much worse than what the family had left. For exam-
ple, a family of two moved from a four-room standard apartment with all
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dents are being displaced by middle and upper income individuals
interested in acquiring inner-city housing on the private market.
The federal courts have become the most recent forum for the class
conflict over urban space.5 The issue, which in one case reached the
Supreme Court," is whether the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) can build, sponsor or subsidize low income
utilities, central heating and hot water, private bath and toilet into a
three-room apartment in poor condition, with no central heating, no
refrigeration, tiny bath in kitchen and a hall toilet. Another family of
three moved from four standard rooms to a six-room "railroad flat" with
not a single enclosed room, holes in the floor and ceiling plaster falling.
Id. at 975. The Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 476 (codified
in scattered sections of 5, 12, 15, 20, 31, 38, 40, 42 U.S.C.) (1976), was enacted to
meet the housing needs of those families who had not realized the national goal as
stated in the 1949 Act. 82 Stat. 601, 42 U.S.C. § 1441a (1976). The 1968 Act was to
effect nationwide urban renewal by providing twenty-six million new and rehabili-
tated housing units, six million of which were to be occupied by low and moderate
income families. Id. See J. KRASNOWIECKI, HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT 243-44
(1969); E. MoRms AND H. HALPRIN, URBAN RENEWAL AND HOUSING 2-3 (Practising
Law Institute 1969).
Concern for declining municipal tax bases was also behind the enactment of recent
Urban Development Action Grant (UDAG) legislation. See 42 U.S.C. § 5318(a)
(Supp. 11 1978) ("In order to promote the . . . development of viable urban com-
munities. . . the Secretary is authorized to make urban development action grants to
severely distressed cities and urban counties to help alleviate physical and economic
deterioration through reclamation of neighborhoods having excessive housing aban-
donment or deterioration, and through community revitalization in areas with popu-
lation outmigration or a stagnating or declining tax base.").
5. Conflicts between the affluent and the poor in urban areas have often centered
on the location of public housing. See, e.g., Forest Hills Residents Ass'n v. New York
City Hous. Auth., 69 Misc. 2d 42, 329 N.Y.S.2d 69 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), rev'd per
curiam, 39 A.D.2d 64, 332 N.Y.S.2d 156 (2d Dep't), aff'd sub nom. Margulis v.
Lindsay, 31 N.Y.2d 167, 286 N.E.2d 724, 335 N.Y.S.2d 285 (1972) (action by
residents of a white, middle class neighborhood to block the construction of public
housing in the neighborhood). During the 1960's, public housing residents, often
black, began claiming that the failure of local housing authorities to locate public
housing in any but black neighborhoods violated their civil rights. See Comment,
The Limits of Litigation: Public Housing Site Selection and the Failure of Injunctive
Relief, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1330, 1331-32 (1974). In Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous.
Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969), for example, the court ordered the city of
Chicago to begin locating public housing outside black areas in order to achieve
integrated housing patterns. During the height of urban renewal, therefore, the class
struggle focused on the power of the state to influence housing patterns. With the
emergence of gentrification, the struggle now takes place primarily in the market-
place, where the poor and working classes cannot match the dollars bid for housing
by the affluent newcomers. The second stage of gentrification, in which the affluent
newcomers seek to homogenize their neighborhoods through the use of the courts, is
the focus of this Article.
6. Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980).
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housing projects within or near revitalized areas.7 The litigation is
usually initiated by affluent newcomers who argue that undue con-
centrations 8 of minority or low income persons in "their" neighbor-
hoods would result if the project were built. 9 Ironically, as the
newcomers litigate "against" racial and economic concentration in the
name of desegregation, they may prevent the racial and economic
reintegration of neighborhoods which have been converted from eth-
nically and economically diverse communities into upper-middle class
preserves. In these cases, gentrification appears as a kind of suburban-
ization in reverse-the effort to keep low income people and minori-
ties from remaining in their own neighborhoods operating as a type of
"reverse exclusionary zoning." 10
This Article examines four attempts to block the construction or
financing of HUD projects in neighborhoods transformed by gentrifi-
cation. It discusses a housing battle which began on New York City's
West Side and was litigated extensively in the federal district"1 and
7. Business Ass'n of Univ. City v. Landrieu, 660 F.2d 867 (3d Cir. 1981); Munoz-
Mendoza v. Pierce, 520 F. Supp. 180 (D. Mass. 1981); Alschuler v. HUD, 515 F.
Supp. 1212 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
8. In Alschuler, plaintiffs contended that federal assistance to low income tenants
under the Section 8 program, see note 200 infra and accompanying text, would
create an "undue concentration" of assisted persons in areas containing a high
proportion of low income persons in violation of 24 C.F.R. § 881.206(c) (1981). 515
F. Supp. at 1220-22. The court rejected plaintiffs' argument, finding no evidence
that the subsidies would create "a minority, low-income ghetto" in the immediate
area. Id. at 1223.
9. For example, the plaintiff business groups in Business Ass'n of Univ. City
argued:
The statutory standard of the 1974 Act is clearly violated by the selection
of the site in this case. Rather than deconcentrate housing opportunities
for persons of lower income, the selection of the site here serves only to
further concentrate lower income persons by placing one of their scarce
new housing opportunities directly adjacent to five hundred and thirty-
two units of federally assisted housing. It is difficult to imagine the crea-
tion of housing opportunities for lower income persons which would
achieve a greater concentration.
Brief for Appellants at 27.
10. Exclusionary zoning "typically refers to zoning intended to exclude person;
unable to afford detached, single family residences on large lots . . . ," Willemsen &
Phillips, Down-Zoning and Exclusionary Zoning in California Law, 31 HASTINGS
L.J. 103, 122 (1979), although the law may be formulated to exclude other groups,
such as mentally retarded persons, from a community, see Hopperton, A State
Legislative Strategy for Ending Exclusionary Zoning of Community Homes, 19 URn.
L. ANN. 47 (1980). The author intends "reverse exclusionary zoning" to connote a
partial shift in values: now small, inner-city lots represent the prime acreage, but the
attempt to exclude minorities and low income persons remains the same.
11. Trinity Episcopal School Corp. v. Romney, 387 F. Supp. 1044 (S.D.N.Y.
1974).
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circuit12 courts. On appeal the United States Supreme Court held in
Stryker's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen,13 that HUD's deci-
sion-making process relating to the placement of low income housing
is beyond judicial review as long as it complies with applicable federal
statutes and regulations.
The Article reviews recent litigation in Philadelphia, Chicago and
Boston in light of Stryker's Bay. In Philadelphia and Chicago, efforts
by HUD to provide low income housing in gentrified neighborhoods
have been opposed as an abuse of its administrative discretion. In
Boston, HUD funding of a business and residential complex is being
challenged by low income residents concerned with the displacement
effect the project would have. Despite the Supreme Court's criticism
of judicial intervention, protracted litigation continues to frustrate
federal efforts to preserve the integrated character of inner-city neigh-
borhoods. Nevertheless, the courts must remain involved particularly
where suits are brought to enforce substantive obligations imposed on
HUD by the Civil Rights Acts. If HUD adopts regulations which
reflect the need to maintain the integrated character of urban housing
in gentrifying neighborhoods, the courts would be more likely to defer
to agency decision-making. Thus undue delays in the implementation
of HUD programs could be avoided.
II. New York City: Strycker's Bay
Neighborhood Council v. Karlen
The West Side Urban Renewal Area (WSURA) is a twenty square
block area with approximately 35,000 residents located on Manhat-
tan's West Side.' 4 In 1956, New York City applied for and received
federal funds, under the Housing Act of 1954,' 5 to undertake a dem-
12. Trinity Episcopal School Corp. v. Romney, 523 F.2d 88 (2d Cir. 1975),
rehearing sub nom. Trinity Episcopal School Corp. v. Harris, 445 F. Supp. 204
(S.D.N.Y.), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Karlen v. Harris, 590 F.2d 39 (2d Cir.
1978).
13. 444 U.S. 223, 227-28 (1980).
14. 387 F. Supp. at 1047. The area stretches between West 87th and West 97th
Streets and between Central Park West and Amsterdam Avenue. Id. The WSURA
represents the northern anchor of the renewal program for the entire West Side of
Manhattan. Lincoln Center represents the southern anchor. Thousands of Latin
Americans, particularly Puerto Ricans, were displaced in the past few decades as a
result of the renewal program and have joined the swelling ranks of the dispossessed
in East New York, Ocean Hill, Brownsville, and the South Bronx. See generally
LYFORD, THE AIRTIGHT CAGE (1966), which traces the history of Manhattan's West
Side from a wealthy preserve in the post-Civil War era to the socially and racially
mixed area that it is today.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 1453 (1976), authorizes grants for urban renewal projects.
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onstration study of the neighborhood now known as the WSURA. 16
James Felt, Chairman of the New York City Planning Commission,
directed the study (Felt Study), which was published in 1958.17 The
Felt Study reported that the neighborhood enjoyed excellent transpor-
tation, cultural, business and recreation facilities, 8 and recom-
mended that existing brownstones and some multi-family dwellings
be rehabilitated.' 9 Thus, the study viewed the preservation and im-
provement of the existing community, and not the creation of a new
one, as the primary objective of any renewal plan for the neighbor-
hood. 20  A key focus of neighborhood preservation was the mainte-
nance of the residential pattern of economic and ethnic integration
which is part of the tradition of the West Side. 2'
Opponents of the original WSURA Plan submitted by the Urban
Renewal Board in 195922 argued at public hearings that the plan
failed to provide sufficient housing for low and middle income fami-
lies.23 As a consequence, the WSURA Plan was amended to increase
the number of planned low income units from 400 to 1,000 and the
number of tax-abated, middle income units from 2,400 to 4,200.24
Later, as a result of continued community pressure, the Board of
Estimate further increased the number of planned low income units to
2,500.25
16. 387 F. Supp. at 1049.
17. NEW YORK CITY PLANNING COMM'N, A REPORT ON THE W. SIDE URBAN RE-
NEWAL STUDY (1958) [hereinafter cited as the Felt Study].
18. Id. at 11.
19. Id. at 5. Thus, the more affluent members of the community could become
owner-occupants of the brownstones and benefit from living in an economically and
ethnically integrated neighborhood. See Note, NEPA, Tipping and Low-Income
Housing, 6 COLUM. J. OF ENVT'L L. 31, 33 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Tipping].
20. Felt Study, supra note 17, at 4-5.
21. The Felt Study declared:
A reduction of the abnormal population turnover and elimination of the
excessive overcrowding which contribute so greatly to the Area's decline [is
our objective.] Maintenance of the economic and ethnic integration
which is part of its tradition, is in accord with accepted City policy . . .
which will take into account the needs of the present population.
Id. at 12. See also Tipping, supra note 19, at 33 and n.10.
22. The Urban Renewal Board was appointed by Mayor Robert Wagner upon the
Felt Study's recommendation that such an agency be created to facilitate planning
for the WSURA. 387 F. Supp. at 1049.
23. Id. at 1050.
24. Id.
25. The breakdown was as follows: 1,010 low income units in new public housing,
280 units in rehabilitated brownstones, and 210 units in a public housing site adja-
cent to the WSURA. Id. at 1051-52.
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All of the public housing projects provided for in the WSURA Plan
were completed by 1965. The next group of planned buildings
completed were four Mitchell-Lama cooperatives and a Mitchell-
Lama rental building. 27 By the time the Mitchell-Lamai buildings
opened in 1967, however, construction costs had increased to a point
which made it unlikely that the city's commitment to 2,500 units of
low and moderate income housing in the WSURA could be ful-
filled .2  The increase in Mitchell-Lama costs, compounded by the
phasing out of rent supplement programs,29 specifically threatened
that portion of the 2,500 low income unit minimum which depended
upon "skewed rentals"30 in the Mitchell-Lama projects. 31
By 1968, construction starts of low income units had stalled com-
pletely, 32 and community representatives began to realize that the
2,500 unit minimum was in danger. In the spring of 1970, an orga-
nized group of squatters took over several vacant buildings in the
WSURA awaiting demolition, 33 including a building on Site 30,14 a lot
located near several low income apartment buildings.3 5 In response
to the squatters' demands the city changed its plans for Site 30 from
middle income to low income housing. 36 This decision gave rise to
litigation which remained in the courts for ten years. 37
26. Id. at 1053.
27. "Mitchell-Lama is the generic or common term used for moderate and middle
income housing developed pursuant to Article II of the Private Housing Finance Law
of the State of New York and assisted by state or municipal mortgage loans and real
estate tax exemption." Id. at n.11.
28. Id. at 1054.
29. Id.
30. "Skewed rentals" result from a "procedure whereby rents in a particular
building are arbitrarily varied so that some are for higher income and some are for
lower income families, the overall average being fixed at the level required to operate
the building economically." Id. at 1051 n.7.
31. Id. at 1054.
32. Id.
33. id. at 1056. The city discovered that there were still 274 squatter families in
the area in 1974. Id.
34. Id. Site 30 is located on the west side of Columbus Avenue between West 90th
and West 91st Streets. Statement on behalf of CONTINUE by Eugene J. Morris
before the New York City Planning Commission, Appendix 1, Part 1 (Sept. 5, 1979)
(Eugene J. Morris was the attorney for CONTINUE, an acronym for Committee of
Neighbors to Insure Normal Urban Environment) [hereinafter cited as Statement on
behalf of CONTINUE].
35. The largest low income housing project in the WSURA, Wise Towers, is
situated next to Site 30. Four other low income or subsidized buildings are located on
West 91st Street in the two block area between Central Park West and Amsterdam
Avenue. Id.
36. 387 F. Supp. at 1056.
37. See Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980).
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The new plan for Site 30 called for a 17-story public housing
project, containing 160 dwelling units and housing for up to 576
persons. 38  First priority for residence at Site 30 was to be given to
those tenants displaced by urban renewal who had remained in the
WSURA and were now residing in temporary quarters.39 Second
priority was to go to tenants directly displaced by urban renewal who
had been forced to leave the WSURA entirely, but who had expressed
a desire to return. 40
It was only after federal funds were committed to the Site 30
project, however, that HUD conducted a Special Environmental
Clearance study. 41  HUD had already determined that the environ-
mental impact of the project was not so great as to require a full-
blown Environmental Impact Statement. 42  The HUD study indi.-
cated that low income housing was needed, 43 that ready access to
community services was available, 44 that the project would not un-
duly burden existing services, 45 and that the project would not ad-
versely affect the environment. 46 In all respects HUD gave Site 30 a
superior or adequate rating. 47 HUD predicted that even a 100 % low
income project would have only a minimal effect on the economic
balance of the WSURA's population, 48 estimating the increase of low
income families in the area to be less than two percent.
49
The Trinity Episcopal School Corporation (Trinity), an elementary
and secondary educational institution located directly across the street
38. 387 F. Supp. at 1080.
39. 42 U.S.C. § 1455(c) (1976), provides that no local public agency will receive a
loan or grant for urban renewal until it has formulated "a feasible method for the
temporary relocation of individuals and families displaced from the urban renewal
area ... .. The section further requires that the temporary housing be in clean and
safe quarters "in the urban renewal area or in other areas not generally less desir-
able .... Id.
40. 445 F. Supp. at 213.
41. 387 F. Supp. at 1079-80. HUD may require compliance with either a Normal
Environmental Clearance, or a Special Environmental Clearance, or an Environ-
mental Impact Statement, depending on the type of project involved. 38 Fed. Reg.
19,182 (1973).
42. 387 F. Supp. at 1080. See 38 Fed. Reg. 19,182 (1973).
43. 387 F. Supp. at 1073-74.
44. Id. at 1074.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. In no instance did HUD receive a poor rating which "results in automatic
disapproval of the project." Id.
48. 445 F. Supp. at 213.
49. Id.
[Vol. X
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from Site 30,50 brought suit against HUD in 1971 to enjoin the con-
struction of the proposed project. 5' Trinity had publicly considered
moving its physical plant outside New York City in 1962 because of
neighborhood deterioration. 52 In response, Trinity alleged, city offi-
cials and a local judge had assured it not only that 2,500 low income
units was the limit for the WSURA, but also that in middle income
buildings such as originally proposed for Site 30, no more than 30 % of
the housing units would be reserved for low income tenants.53  Trin-
ity maintained that its commitment to remain in the neighborhood
was made in reliance upon these assurances. 54 It further argued that
the project was illegal: it violated the requirements of the National
Environmental Policy Act of 196955 by creating a "pocket ghetto" 56
which would contribute to neighborhood tipping within the meaning
of Otero v. New York City Housing Authority.51
Several parties intervened in the action. The Committee of Neigh-
bors to Insure a Normal Urban Environment (CONTINUE), advo-
cates for some of the neighborhood's more affluent residents, inter-
vened on the side of the plaintiffs.58 Two other intervenors on the
plaintiff's side, Karlen and Hudgins, were brownstone owners who
had invested $148,000 and $265,000 respectively in their brownstones
50. Trinity School was founded in 1709 as a companion to Columbia College. Site
24 is located at 100 West 92nd Street; Site 30 is located at 100 West 93rd Street.
Statement on behalf of CONTINUE, supra note 34.
51. 387 F. Supp. at 1047 n.2.
52. 523 F.2d at 90.
53. 387 F. Supp. at 1060.
54. 523 F.2d at 90. Trinity had invested in the community by building an annex to
the school and granting the air rights over the annex for the construction of a
residential tower for middle income tenants. See Tipping, supra note 19, at 34 n.14.
55. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4369 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
56. 387 F. Supp. at 1074.
57. 484 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1973). In Otero, the district court had granted sum-
mary judgment permanently enjoining the New York City Housing Authority from
renting apartments in a public housing project until all persons who were displaced
-from the site with a promise they could return were afforded leases in the project.
Otero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 354 F. Supp. 941, 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). The
circuit court reversed and remanded, holding that the Housing Authority "may limit
the number of apartments to be made available to persons of white or non-white
races, including minority groups, where it can show that such action is essential to
promote a racially balanced community and to avoid concentrated racial pockets
that will result in a segregated community." 484 F.2d at 1140. See Note, Tipping the
Scales of Justice: A Race-Conscious Remedy for Neighborhood Transition, 90 YALE
L.J. 377 (1980); Note, The Benign Housing Quota: A Legitimate Weapon to Fight
White Flight and Resulting Segregated Community? 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 891
(1974).
58. 387 F. Supp. at 1047 n.2.
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in the WSURA. 59 They asserted that when they purchased and reha-
bilitated their brownstones they relied on city representations identi-
cal to those cited by Trinity: that the number of low income units
would not exceed 2,500 and that no more than 30 % of the units in any
WSURA middle income building would be reserved for low income
tenants.60 Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, 6 ' intervenors on the
side of the defendants, took a contrary position, maintaining that Site
30 must be converted from a mixed middle and low income project to
a 100% low income project in order to protect the 2,500 low income
unit goal and also to house former WSURA residents who had been
displaced by urban renewal. 2
A. The District Court Decision
In Trinity School v. Rornney,'6 the District Court for the Southern
District of New York approved the use of Site 30 for a low income
apartment building.64 The court discerned four major issues: (1)
whether the City Housing Authority had breached any contract with
Trinity or the plaintiffs-intervenors; (2) whether the current Site 30
proposal conformed to the West Side Urban Renewal Plan; (3)
whether the development of Site 30 as 100 % low income would create
a "pocket ghetto"; and (4) whether HUD had complied with the
relevant provisions of the Natural Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) .65 The court ruled in favor of the defendants on each of the
four issues. 6
District Judge Cooper held that the 2,500 low income unit figure
was not an irrevocable commitment, but a goal, or "political judg-
ment," permissibly balanced against the economic integration.of the
area and the underlying purpose of the WSURA Plan. 67 The key
objective, according to the court, was striking a balance between
available services and facilities and the need of low income persons
seeking relocation within the WSURA.68 Judge Cooper dismissed the
59. Id. at 1053.
60. 523 F.2d at 90.
61. The Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, a public interest group of commu-
nity residents and organizations, was formed in 1958. LYFORD, supra note 14, at 121.
Strycker's Bay is an umbrella organization for community groups, schools, anti-pov-
erty organizations, and the local branch of the National Welfare Rights organization.
Interview with Doris Rosenbloom, former president of Strycker's Bay, July 7, 1980.
62. 523 F.2d at 90-91.
63. 387 F. Supp. 1044 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
64. Id. at 1085.
65. 387 F. Supp. at 1048. The National Environmental Policy Act is codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 4321-4369 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
66. 387 F. Supp. at 1085.
67. Id. at 1058-59.
68. Id. at 1065.
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plaintiffs' contentions that the project would create a pocket ghetto.6 9
The court was not persuaded that the construction of public housing
on Site 30 would cause the neighborhood to tip 70 and further held that
the law is concerned with tipping only as it relates to racial, and not to
economic, imbalance. 71
The plaintiffs' arguments that HUD had not conducted an ade-
quate environmental review also were dismissed by the court. 72 The
court acknowledged that NEPA requires HUD to consider physical
factors such as the size of a neighborhood's minority population, the
proximity of public housing projects to upper income areas, and the
availability of public services when evaluating environmental im-
pact. 73 Consideration of such factors, however, should not be con-
fused with prohibited consideration of the subjective attitudes of the
resident population as to environmental impact.74  For example, in
Nucleus of Chicago Homeowners Association v. Lynn, 75 the plaintiffs
requested a court interpreting NEPA to accept the proposition that
low income people, as contrasted with the more affluent, "possess a
higher propensity toward criminal behavior and acts of physical vio-
lence, a disregard for the physical and aesthetic maintenance of real
and personal property, and a lower commitment to hard work."' 76
The Lynn court refused to accept such a blatantly prejudicial view
and rejected the plaintiffs' claim. 77 Perhaps the real question which
the district court had to decide was whether it would permit the more
affluent WSURA residents to use NEPA machinery to block the con-
struction of a public housing project.
69. Id. at 1074-75.
70. Id. at 1073. The court stated "that the tipping point of a community is that
point at which a set of conditions has been created that will lead to the rapid flight of
an existing majority class under circumstances of instability which result in the
deterioration of the neighborhood environment." Id. at 1065-66. See Ackerman,
Integration for Subsidized Housing and the Question of Racial Occupancy Controls,
26 STAN. L. REV. 245 (1974).
71. 387 F. Supp. at 1064. The court expressly rejected the proposition that anti-so-
cial behavior and the propensity to induce neighborhood deterioration could be
associated with low income families. Id. at 1065.
72. Id. at 1079, 1083.
73. Id. at 1078. The court stated, "[T]he quality of community services such as the
degree of crime, police protection, schools, hospitals, fire protection, recreation,
transportation, and commercial establishments are essential to a NEPA study." Id.
74. Id. at 1078-79. See Tipping, supra note 19, at 44.
75. 372 F. Supp. 147 (N.D. Ill. 1973), aff'd, 524 F.2d 225 (1975), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 967 (1976).
76. Id. at 149.
77. Id. at 150.
1982]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
The district court in Trinity School, citing with favor the result in
Lynn,7" held that "neither the alleged antisocial propensities of low
income persons nor the fears which their increasing presence may
engender are objective criteria of community stability and as such do
not fall within the ambit of a NEPA study. ' 79  As a result, the court
upheld HUD's determination that the conversion of Site 30 to public
housing would have a minimal environmental impact and found that
such determination was neither arbitrary nor capricious.80
B. The Court of Appeals Decisions
In the first appeal from the district court opinion, the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit"' upheld the district court on the
tipping,82 breach of contract, 3 and the WSURA Plan compliance
issues,84 but reversed and remanded on the environmental issue.8 5 On
remand, the district court was directed to require that HUD study
alternatives, consistent with the WSURA Plan, to the proposal to
change Site 30 to 100 % low income housing.8 6 Even though uphold-
ing HUD's determination that an Environmental Impact Statement
was not required,87 the court of appeals found that HUD's acceptance
of the Housing Authority's conclusion that no alternatives existed to
the proposed development of Site 30 failed as a matter of law to meet
NEPA directives88 because "unresolved conflicts" remained concern-
ing "alternative uses of available resources."8 9'
While the court of appeals expressly rejected the tipping argument,
it appeared to sympathize with the plaintiff's position. In what
78. 387 F. Supp. at 1079.
79. Id. See Tipping, supra note 19, at 44.
80. 387 F. Supp. at 1079.
81. Trinity Episcopal School Corp. v. Romney, 523 F.2d 88 (2d Cir. 1975).
82. Id. at 92.
83. Id. at 91.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 95.
86. Id. The court indicated that HUD should consider alternative locations for the
project, the dispersal of the low income units throughout the area, the possibility of
rehabilitating existing buildings, and the alternative of not building the project at all.
Id. at 92.
87. Id. See note 65 supra.
88. 42 U.S.C. § 102(2)(E) (1976). When the court of appeals rendered its decision
in 1975, the section was codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(D). The section was rede-
signated by Act of Aug. 9, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-83, 89 Stat. 424. The section requires
HUD to "study, develop, and describe appropriate alternatives to recommended
courses of action in any proposal which involves unresolved conflicts concerning
alternative uses of available resources."
89. 523 F.2d at 93, 95.
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seemed like a pouring of the old "tipping" wine of Otero9" into a new
environmental bottle, the court held that NEPA gave the plaintiffs the
substantive right to live in an integrated community and that integra-
tion must be consistent throughout the WSURA. 91 This right could
not be realized by concentrating low income housing on one street and
"compensating for this segregation by an equal concentration of mid-
dle-income housing" on another street. 92 The court of appeals thus
not only interpreted NEPA as granting substantive, rather than
merely procedural rights, but also transposed the Otero standard,
used in limiting racial segregation, to a case involving limits on eco-
nomic segregation.
On remand, 93 the district court examined a revised Special Environ-
mental Clearance submitted by HUD and declared itself satisfied that
HUD had complied with the mandate of the court of appeals.9 4
HUD's principal arguments were, as before, that a transfer of the Site
30 project to an alternative site would unduly delay the commence-
ment of construction and that middle class resistance to low income
housing would be equal or greater at all alternative sites.9 5 The
district court accepted HUD's arguments, finding no abuse of discre-
tion within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act.96 The
court granted HUD's motion for summary judgment, lifted the in-
junction against low income development of Site 30, and dismissed the
complaint .
The plaintiffs appealed once again to the Second Circuit. In Karlen
v. Harris,98 the court of appeals, in an extraordinary intervention in
agency decision making processes, stated that NEPA's substantive
requirements would be disserved by the city's decision to build a
"17-story apartment building exclusively for low-income tenants in an
area already containing a high percentage of low-income housing." 99
The court stated that the city's proposed development of Site 30 would
90. Otero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1973); see note
57 supra and accompanying text.
91. 523 F.2d at 94.
92. Id. at 95.
93. Trinity Episcopal School Corp. v. Harris, 445 F. Supp. 204 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
94. Id. at 217-18.
95. Id. at 216.
96. Id. at 220. The relevant section of the Administrative Procedure Act is codified
at 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976).
97. 445 F. Supp. at 223.
98. 590 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1978).
99. Id. at 43. By its decision, the court of appeals clearly incorporated a "substan-
tive aim of dispersal of low-income housing" into NEPA law in the Second Circuit.
See Tipping, supra note 19, at 38.
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create an undue concentration of low income housing in the immedi-
ate area, creating an impermissible alteration of the environment
within the meaning of NEPA. 00 Because HUD, solely in order to
avoid construction delay,10' had chosen Site 30 over two sites which
the court of appeals considered environmentally superior, the court
considered HUD's decision an abuse of discretion. 10 2 The court of
appeals again remanded the case to the district court, with instruc-
tions that HUD take steps to alleviate the shortage of low income
housing in a manner that would avoid the "concentration" of such
housing on Site 30.103
C. The Supreme Court Decision
The defendants appealed the court of appeals decision directly to
the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court's per curiarn summary rever-
sal of Karlen in Strycker's Bail Neighborhood Council v. Karlen 104 was
startlingly brief. Holding that the court of appeals had departed from
the confines of the Administrative Procedure Act, the Court stated
that NEPA created procedural, not substantive, rights. 0 5 A review-
ing court's only role under NEPA is to insure that the agency has
"considered" the environmental consequences. 10 6 Under no circum-
stances may a reviewing court "interject itself within the area of
discretion of the executive as to the choice of the action to be
taken." 1 07
The Supreme Court, commenting on an ambiguous record, inter-
preted the court of appeals holding not as overturning an arbitrary or
capricious decision by HUD, 08 but rather as an attempt by the court
100. Id. at 43-44. See Douw, Poor People as Environmental Hazards. 10 Soc.
POLICY 29 (1979).
101. 590 F.2d at 44.
102. Id. at 45.
103. Id.
104. 444 U.S. 223 (1980).
105. Id. at 227.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 227-28, citing Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976),
citing National Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 838 (D.C. Cir.
1972). See Note, The Decline of the Environmental Mandate: Strykers' Bay-A
Modern West Side Story, 41 LA. L. REV. 1354 (1981) [hereinafter cited as West Side
Story] for a review of the standards governing NEPA law prior to the Stryckers' Bay
decision. Cf. Aertsen v. Landrieu, 488 F. Supp. 314, 322-23 (D. Mass. 1980) (inter-
preting the standards governing NEPA and Title VIII).
108. 444 U.S. at 228 n.2. Although the court of appeals carefully avoided stating
that HUD's decision was arbitrary and capricious, the court did find the decision
reversible as a matter of law. "We find that HUD's acceptance of the 'no alternatives'
conclusion as a matter of law fails to meet the directive of 102(2)(D) of NEPA." 523
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to impose its own priorities on HUD's decision-making process. The
court of appeals had refused to accept HUD's elevation of other,
admittedly legitimate considerations, over environmental concerns. 109
According to the Supreme Court, such a "reordering of priorities by a
reviewing court" was impermissible. 0 The Court held that NEPA
required no more of HUD than that it "consider" the environmental
consequences of its decisions and that NEPA was concerned with
procedural inputs rather than substantive outcomes."'
The ideologies of the protagonists in the Site 30 case seem ironically
inverted. On the one hand, an organization dedicated to the economic
and ethnic integration of the West Side took an "anti-integration"
stance: it was necessary to build a 100 % low income project on Site 30
in order to insure a minimum number of low income persons in the
WSURA as a whole. On the other hand, persons and organizations
opposed to the construction of new low income units in the WSURA,
attempted to block the 100 % low income project under the banner of
"integrated housing" in order to promote residential class segregation
in the WSURA as a whole." 12
Raising the banner of integration, the conservative forces in the Site
30 case were rewarded with a dissent from Justice Marshall." 3 Mar-
shall's opinion, while taking a liberal view on challenges to agency
decision-making, would help preserve the environment that the plain-
tiffs sought to maintain.1' 4 The majority opinion is just the oppo-
site-the decision removes an obstacle to the ethnic and economic
F.2d at 95. A decision "not in accordance with law," however, is as violative of the
Administrative Procedure Act as one which is arbitrary and capricious. 5 U.S.C. §
706(2)(B) (1976).
109. 444 U.S. at 228 n.2. Thus, the Court's decision constitutes an "implict
acquiescence in the view that the concept of the 'environment' contemplated by
NEPA is broad enough to include the issue of whether or not low-income public
housing sites are sufficiently dispersed." Tipping, supra note 19, at 39. But see West
Side Story, supra note 107, which concludes that Strycker's Bay transforms the
"laudable goals" of NEPA into "merely empty aims." Id. at 1374.
110. 444 U.S. at 228 n.2.
111. Id. at 227.
112. It is perhaps for this reason that one commentator has called upon the
Supreme Court to rule NEPA wholly inapplicable to issues of low income and
minority housing concentration. See Tipping, supra note 19, at 32. The commentator
argues that the inclusion of such concerns constitutes an unprecedented extension of
the statute, id. at 39-45, is unsupported by'its plain meaning or by the legislative
history, id. at 45-46, and is inadvisable as a matter of policy. id. at 46-60.
113. 444 U.S. 223, 228 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
114. Justice Marshall never expressly supported plaintiffs' position in favor of
maintaining the status quo in the WSURA. If the Court had adopted Justice Mar-
shall's position on the procedural law, however, the effect would have been to
maintain the status quo for several more years while HUD was forced to reconsider
its options.
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integration of the WSURA-its interpretation of environmental law,
however, is quite conservative in that it discourages judicial review of
the administrative process.115
Justice Marshall sought to distinguish the case relied upon by the
majority, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC,16 as a
case which did no more than prohibit a court from substituting its
judgment for that of an administrative agency. 1 7 According to Mar-
shall, the reviewing court's duty to insure that an agency's decision is
not arbitrary or capricious requires it to review the standards for
decision-making established by relevant legislation and to determine
that the agency has in fact conformed to those standards." 8 Such a
review would necessarily involve an independent examination by the
appellate court and would go beyond a cursory glance to see if the
agency had complied with the minimum necessary formalities." 9
The reviewing court's examination would still be "essentially proce-
dural,"1 20 according to Marshall, but would permit the reviewing
court to require the agency to take a "hard look" at the environmental
consequences of its actions.' 2' Justice Marshall argued that if HUD
had decided to reject environmentally preferable alternatives solely to
avoid delay, such a decision was prima facie arbitrary and capricious
and, therefore, of sufficient controversy to merit plenary consider-
ation by the Court. 22
Despite HUD's "victory" at the Supreme Court level, construction
of the Site 30 project has yet to begin. The plaintiffs in this protracted
litigation may have succeeded in their goal of blocking construction
simply by creating so many delays 2 3 that HUD and the city can no
115. 444 U.S. at 227-28.
116. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
117. 444 U.S. at 229-31. Plaintiffs in Vermont Yankee sought to block the con-
struction of nuclear power plants by challenging the Atomic Energy Commission's
procedures in granting licenses. In an opinion written by Justice Rehnquist, the
Court held that "[a]bsent constitutional constraints or extremely compelling circum-
stances," federal agencies must be left free to conduct their proceedings within the
guidelines set for them by Congress and the agencies themselves. 435 U.S. at 543.
118. 444 U.S. at 230-31.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 231. See, e.g., Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449
F.2d 1109 (D.C.C. 1971) (consideration of environmental matters must be more than
a "pro jorma ritual"). See also West Side Story, supra note 107, at 1358, 1364, 1368.
122. 444 U.S. at 231.
123. One indication that plaintiffs were well aware of the delays they were
causing appeared in plaintiff Trinity School's newspaper shortly after Judge Cooper
rendered his first decision in 1974. The article stated that Trinity School had yet to
decide whether to appeal the decision, but noted "[a]n appeal by Trinity to a higher
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longer afford to finance the project. 2 4 Such a result would be unfor-
tunate. HUD predicted in 1978 that the failure to provide low income
housing on Site 30 would "unquestionably lead to inter-group tension
in the neighborhood which would be a potential adverse social envi-
ronmental impact of greater magnitude than the more limited poten-
tial adverse effects of public housing construction on Site 30." 125
III. Philadelphia: Business Association of
University City v. Landrieu
Attempts to construct housing for low income families in Philadel-
phia often have been met by challenges from area residents and
businessmen. 2  Although the challenges usually fail,127 they do suc-
court would delay construction for an estimated two more years. The Trinity
Times, Dec. 19, 1974, at 1.
124. Furthermore, the Reagan Administration has indicated that HUD will no
longer supervise the implementation of the WSURA Plan. N.Y. Times, Dec. 11,
1981, at B3, col. 3. Construction may therefore begin on fair market rental buildings
without guarantees that low income units will also be built. Id.
125. 445 F. Supp. at 218.
126. The opposition to HUD projects in two neighborhoods illustrates some of the
problems Philadelphia has had. In the Whitman Park section of Philadelphia, HUD
has been attempting to construct a public housing project since 1956. Resident
Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 425 F. Supp. 987, 995 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd in relevant part,
564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978). Whitman Park is a
predominantly white neighborhood which once housed a greater proportion of black
residents. 425 F. Supp. at 1009. From 1956 to 1976, Whitman Park residents man-
aged to block the construction of the housing project by challenging HUD's every
move, engaging the support of city government, and organizing mass demonstrations
at the housing site. Id. at 993-1006. In 1976, a federal judge, noting that "The City
of Philadelphia is today a racially segregated city" id. at 1006, ordered construction
to begin on the Whitman Park project. Id. at 1029. After Whitman Park residents
had unsuccessfully pressed their appeal to the Supreme Court, 435 U.S. 908, they
attempted to block construction by arguing, as had the plaintiffs in New York's Site
30 case, see Section II supra, that HUD had not complied with the National Environ-
mental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). Sworob v.
Harris, 451 F. Supp. 96 (E.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd, 578 F.2d 1376 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1089 (1979). The court held that the plaintiffs' claim was barred by res
judicata and the doctrifne of laches. 451 F. Supp. at 101. After unsuccessfully pressing
their appeal to the Supreme Court a second time, 439 U.S. 1089, Whitman Park
residents picketed the construction site. When several picketers blocked entrances in
defiance of an injunction, they were arrested by police. United States v. Pyle, 518 F.
Supp. 139 (E.D. Pa. 1981). The picketers were convicted of criminal contempt, id. at
143, and their convictions were upheld on appeal, id. at 162 (one defendant was
acquitted on appeal). Construction has yet to be completed on the project, id. at 141,
more than 25 years after the site was approved.
In the Washington Square West area of Philadelphia, low and moderate income
persons, predominantly nonwhite, were displaced by urban renewal activities in the
1960's. Fox v. HUD, 468 F. Supp. 907, 909-10 (E.D. Pa. 1979). When HUD and the
city failed to provide replacement housing in the neighborhood for low and moderate
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ceed in delaying the construction of the housing for several years. 2 8
In Shannon v. HUD,2 9 however, neighborhood residents and busi-
nessmen in an urban renewal area successfully blocked federal subsi-
dies to a low income housing project on the ground that further
assistance could result in an undue concentration of minorities in the
neighborhood. 30 When businessmen in the University City section of
Philadelphia, a neighborhood now being gentrified, recently chal-
lenged HUD's plan to construct low income housing in that area, they
naturally relied on Shannon in support of their position.' 3'
A. The Third Circuit's Decision in Shannon
The plaintiffs in Shannon were residents, businessmen and repre-
sentatives of private civic organizations based in an urban renewal
income persons, the displacees sought to enjoin further urban renewal activities in
the area, alleging that HUD had "transformed a formerly racially and economically
integrated community into a predominantly white, affluent one." Id. at 910. After
10 years of litigation, a federal court approved a settlement in 1978 whereby HUD
agreed to fund new housing for the displacees in the Washington Square West area.
Id. at 910-11.
The challenges to the construction of low income housing in Philadelphia have
extended well beyond the Whitman Park and Washington Square West neighbor-
hoods. The Resident Advisory Bd. court observed, "In the years between 1967 and
1972, several public housing projects, in addition to the Whitman Park Townhouse
Project, were proposed for construction in predominantly White areas, but were
never completed because of public opposition." 425 F. Supp. at 1009. As a commu-
nity group representing low income persons argued in Business Ass'n of Univ. City v.
Landrieu, 660 F.2d 867 (3d Cir. 1981), "The City of Philadelphia has had a long
history of abysmal performance in providing housing opportunities for low-income
minority families...." Brief for Appellees, Resident Advisory Bd. and Tenant
Action Group at 1.
127. See, e.g., Sworob v. Harris, 451 F. Supp. 96 (E.D. Pa. 1978), af'd, 578 F.2d
1376 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1089 (1979) (second challenge to Whitman
Park project barred on res judicata and laches grounds); Resident Advisory Bd. v.
Rizzo, 425 F. Supp. 987 (E.D. Pa. 1976), afJ'd in relevant part, 564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978) (first challenge to Whitman Park project
defeated).
128. In the Washington Square West neighborhood, see note 126 supra, plaintiffs
seeking relief against discriminatory practices by HUD were not afforded relief until
10 years had passed. Fox v. HUD, 468 F. Supp at 909. In the Whitman Park
neighborhood, see note 126 supra, construction has yet to be completed on a project
delayed since 1956. United States v. Pyle, 518 F. Supp. at 141.
129. 436 F.2d 809 (3rd Cir. 1970). See notes 132-140 infra and accompanying
text.
130. 436 F.2d at 822-23.
131. Brief for Appellants at 13-14, Business Ass'n of Univ. City v. Landrieu, 660
F.2d 867 (3d Cir. 1981) (arguing that under Shannon, "[i]t is now well settled that
HUD has an affirmative duty to promote racial integration through its housing
policy," id. at 13).
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area of Philadelphia.1 32 They sought to enjoin HUD not only from
providing mortgage insurance' 33 to a subsidized housing project in the
neighborhood, but also from making rent supplement payments 3 4 to
the project's tenants.135 The plaintiffs argued that the project would
increase "the already high concentration of low income black resi-
dents"'136 in the neighborhood. They further contended that HUD
should be required to consider the effects its selection of a housing site
would have on any racial concentration in the surrounding area. 37
The district court dismissed the complaint. 38  The Third Circuit
vacated the order of dismissal and instructed the district court to
enjoin further HUD assistance to the project 139 until HUD considered
the effects that its decision would have on racial concentration in the
area. 14  The court of appeals acknowledged the need to continue
building housing for low and moderate income persons, but recog-
nized a concurrent need to promote racially and economically inte-
grated housing. It determined that HUD must adopt some institution-
alized method for including the goal of integrated housing in its
planning and decision-making process, but stopped short of deciding
what priority that goal should have. 41
Pursuant to Shannon and the Second Circuit's decision in Otero,142
Congress incorporated into the Housing and Community Develop-
132. 436 F.2d at 811. According to the court, the plaintiffs included both white
and black residents and both homeowners and tenants. Id. The urban renewal area
was the East Poplar Urban Renewal Area, a neighborhood containing a number of
public housing projects at the time of the litigation. Id. at 819.
133. Mortgage insurance is available under the National Housing Act of 1934, 12
U.S.C. § 17151 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
134. For a discussion of HUD's program for making rent supplement payments,
see note 144 infra.
135. The housing project, Fairmont Manor, was completed before the Third
Circuit rendered its decision, but HUD had yet to issue a mortgage insurance
contract for the project. 436 F.2d at 812.
136. Id.
137. Id. Thus plaintiffs challenged not only HUD's substantive decision, but also
its decision-making process.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 822-23. The court prohibited further assistance to the project as a
whole and expressly exempted from its order rent supplement payments made di-
rectly to qualified tenants in the project.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 820-23. The court cited Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42
U.S.C. §§ 3610-3613 (1976 & Supp. III 1979), and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1976), in support of its position. Id.
142. Otero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1973). See note
57 supra and accompanying text.
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ment Act of 1974,143 requirements that HUD officials consider the
impact that Section 8 housing subsidies 144 may have on the racial and
economic concentration of a neighborhood. 145  The administrative
regulations adopted in the wake of the 1974 Act left no doubt that
Congress sought to promote integrated neighborhoods -as part of the
nation's housing policy. 14
6
143. 88 Stat. 633 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 12, 20, 31, 40, 42, 49 U.S.C.
(1976 & Supp. III 1979)).
144. The original Section 8 of the United States Housing Act of 1937, Pub. L. No.
75-412, § 8, 50 Stat. 888, 891, authorized the United States Housing Authority to
"make, amend, and rescind such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry
out the provisions of this Act." The Housing and Community Development Act of
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 201 (a) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437-1437j (1976 &
Supp. 1II 1979)), amended the 1937 Act and added a new Section 8 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1437f (1976 & Supp. III 1979)). The purposes and scope of the new Section
8 are broad: "For the purpose of aiding lower-income families in obtaining a decent
place to live and of promoting economically mixed housing, assistance payments may
be made with respect to existing, newly constructed, and substantially rehabilitated
housing in accordance with the provisions of this section." 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(a)
(1976). Under the current law, the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
may enter into "annual contribution contracts" with local public housing agencies, or
if no public housing agency is qualified, with private owners of buildings. Id. §
1437f(b). These contracts guarantee that HUD will pay owners the difference be-
tween the maximum monthly rent which the owner is entitled to receive (based on
fair market rental rates in the area) and the amount which a low income family can
afford to pay. Id. § 1437f(c) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). The contracts permit owners to
select their tenants, but owners must give "preference to families which occupy
substandard housing or are involuntarily displaced at the time they are seeking
assistance under this section." Id. § 1437f(d)(1)(A). See generally Section 8 Leased
Housing Assistance Program: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on Govern-
ment Operations, 95th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1977-78).
145. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(c)(4)(A) (1976 & Supp. III 1979), which re-
quires local housing agencies dispersing Section 8 subsidies to establish "tenant selec-
tion criteria designed to assure that, within a reasonable period of time, the project
will include families with a broad range of incomes and will avoid concentrations of
low-income and deprived families with serious social problems .. "
146. 24 C.F.R. § 880.206(c)(1) (1981), for example, requires that no site for a
Section 8 "new construction" project may be located in:
An area of minority concentration unless (i) sufficient, comparable oppor-
tunities exist for housing minority families, in the income range to be
served by the proposed project, outside areas of minority concentration, or
(ii) the project is necessary to meet overriding housing needs which cannot
otherwise feasibly be met in that housing market area.
The regulation further provides that the second exception does not apply if the lack of
feasibility is due to discrimination in other neighborhoods. Id. The regulations also
require that the site "avoid undue concentration of assisted persons in areas contain-
ing a high proportion of low-income persons." Id. § 880.206(d). The site selection
criteria for Section 8 "substantial rehabilitation" projects are less stringent but reveal
a similar purpose. Id. § 881.206(c) (site must avoid "undue concentration," but no
requirement comparable to § 880.206(c)(1)).
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B. The Third Circuit and Gentrification
In Business Association of University City v. Landrieu, 147 two local
business organizations sought to enjoin HUD from providing Section 8
rental subsidies 148 to a low income private housing project scheduled
for construction in a gentrified neighborhood.149 The project was to
be built within the gentrified area surrounding the University of
Pennsylvania, but adjacent to a black ghetto. 150 Pursuant to HUD
guidelines,' 5 ' a Fair Housing/Equal Opportunity specialist reviewed
1970 census data and other information 152 concerning the area sur-
rounding the project and determined that even if the area had been
"racially impacted" 153 in 1970, it was no longer impacted at the time
of his review. 154  The specialist concluded that the neighborhood's
minority population had decreased significantly since 1970 because of
gentrification and the general redevelopment of the area.155
The plaintiffs alleged that HUD did not fulfill its responsibilites
under the Section 8 program 156 and Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1968 157 when it failed to adequately consider the increased concen-
147. 660 F.2d 867 (3d Cir. 1981).
148. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (1976 & Supp. III 1979). See note 144 supra.
149. 660 F.2d at 871, 874.
150. The 1970 census indicated that the University City area (Census Tract 88)
had a 13.9% non-white population. Id. at 871. Two communities abutting Univer-
sity City and located close to the proposed project, Census Tracts 91 and 92, had
minority populations of 65.3% and 98.4 % respectively. Id.
151. 24 C.F.R. § 880.206 (1981).
152. The specialist inspected the site, spoke with local realtors, and reviewed
statistics concerning students at the local elementary school. 660 F.2d at 873. The
specialist had been a resident of the area for almost 20 years, id. at 872, and used his
personal knowledge of housing patterns to supplement his findings, id. at 873.
153. The court found that HUD's internal guidelines indicate that a racially
impacted area is one in which minorities represent more than 40% of the total
population. Id. at 872.
154. Id. at 873.
155. Id. at 873-74. The court never required HUD to specify the boundaries of the
non-impacted area. The court stated, "[t]he definition of the relevant 'area' is neces-
sarily a highly subtle judgment which can be formed through an assessment of past,
existing and future housing patterns, social interaction betweeen members of the
community, and economic development." Id. at 874. The HUD specialist's conclu-
sion that the site was situated in a gentrified and "increasingly white middle class
section of the City" was sufficient for the court. Id.
156. See notes 144-46 supra and accompanying text.
157. Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)) declares: "It is the
policy of the United States to provide, within constitutional limitation, for fair
housing throughout the United States." Accordingly, Title VIII prohibits discrimina-
tion on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in the sale or rental of
housing, 42 U.S.C. § 3604, the financing of housing, id. § 3605, and the provision of
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tration of minorities and low income persons that would result from
the construction and rental of the subsidized units.'5 8 They further
argued that placement of a low income housing project next to a
racially impacted area constituted an impermissible racial concentra-
tion as a matter of law. 59  The plaintiffs also contended that HUD
should be required to review whether the project "constituted a ra-
tional utilization, of land and resources."' 60  The district court re-
jected the plaintiffs' arguments and denied their request for an injunc-
tion.' 16
On appeal, the court of appeals reviewed HUD's procedure for
approving Section 8 projects 6 2 and found that HUD had not abused
its discretion in selecting the University City site. 6 3 The court held
that HUD had adequately considered whether the project would be
built in an area of minority concentration, even though HUD had not
made a formal study of the changes which had occurred in the neigh-
brokerage services, id. § 3606. HUD's duty to promote fair housing extends to
"prospective situations as well as to past or continuing practices in the private and
public sector." Munoz-Mendoza v. Pierce, 520 F. Supp. 180, 185 (D. Mass. 1981). 24
C.F.R. § 105 is the enabling regulation for Title VIII and sets forth HUD procedures
with respect to discriminatory housing practice complaints filed under Section 810 of
Title VIII. 24 C.F.R. § 106 provides for HUD administrative meetings to carry out
the fair housing objectives of Title VIII.
158. 660 F.2d at 869.
159. Id. at 871-72.
160. Id. at 872.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 873-75. A developer seeking to build new rental housing under the
Section 8 program must comply with a number of agency procedures before con-
struction may begin. See Section 8 Housing Assistance Payments Program for New
Construction, 24 C.F.R. §§ 880.102, .301-311 (1981). HUD's selection process
begins with its publication of a "notification of funds availability" (NOFA), inform-
ing local developers of a planned Section 8 project. Id. § 880.102(b). The developers
obtain a detailed "developer's packet" at their HUD field office. Id. Each developer
then submits a preliminary proposal which must contain, inter alia, sketches of the
proposed housing, descriptions of the proposed site and neighborhood, the projected
rent per unit, information about any persons who will be displaced by the new
housing, and the proposed methods and terms of financing the project. Id. § 880.305.
The developer must also certify in his preliminary proposal that he intends to comply
with a number of fair housing statutes. Id. § 880.305(h) (1981). Once HUD receives
and reviews the preliminary proposal, it ranks them and selects the highest ranking
proposals. 24 C.F.R. § 880.102(c) (1981). The developers who submitted selected
preliminary proposals must then submit final proposals. Id. § 880.102(d). These final
proposals must contain more detailed architectural drawings, site plans, and cost
estimates. Id. § 880.308. When HUD approves a final proposal, the developer must
then submit its architect's working drawings for review. Id. § 880.102(d). Once HUD
finds everything in order, it enters into an agreement with the developer which states
that the parties will enter into a contract on the successful completion of the project
which will provide the owner of the project with housing assistance payments. Id.
163. 660 F.2d at 869.
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borhood since the 1970 census. 6 4 The court also rejected the plain-
tiffs' argument that mere proximity to a racially impacted area should
defeat the project.16 5 Furthermore, the court held that while HUD
should promote rational land use, Congress did not intend "to require
HUD to consider the site's most economically rational land use in each
housing decision."' 6
The court of appeals distinguished its present decision to deny the
plaintiffs' request for an injunction from its decision eleven years
earlier in Shannon, which granted injunctive relief to plaintiffs repre-
senting similar interests.16 7  Shannon, according to the court, "only
required housing officials to thoughtfully weigh the question of racial
impact." 8 In interpreting University City, however, it is important
to note that the fact pattern was somewhat different from Shannon.
The University City court acknowledged that HUD had been with-
holding $21,000,000 in block grants to Philadelphia because of the
city's poor record in constructing low income units in non-impacted
areas. 6 9  These circumstances lent additional credence to HUD's
analysis of racial factors. 170
As in Strycker's Bay, the plaintiffs in University City opposed the
construction of low income housing on the ground that it would not
164. The court stated that in view of the specialist's experience in the area, no
formal study was required. Id. at 874.
165. Plaintiffs had argued that if the site for the project were moved across the
street into Census Tract 91, then it could not be built because it would be located in
an impacted area. Id. at 875. Plaintiffs also contended that the project's tenants
"would much more likely relate to the neighborhood directly across the street" than
the gentrified University City neighborhood. Id. The court politely rejected plain-
tiffs' view, stating, "[w]e declined to hold as a matter of law that the population of
proposed projects will necessarily become part of nearby racially concentrated com-
munities." Id.
166. Id. at 877. Plaintiffs made a final claim on appeal, which the court rejected.
They argued that the district court's expedited hearing schedule was an abuse of
discretion because it limited their ability to prepare for trial. Id. The court of appeals
found no serious prejudice to the plaintiffs. Id. at 878.
167. See notes 132-140 supra and accompanying text.
168. 660 F.2d at 874. The court correctly stated that Shannon "did not mandate
the adoption of extensive procedures to investigate all housing possibilities which
would result in undue delay to the start of construction." Id. (citation omitted). In
Shannon, the court stated, "[w]e hold only that the agency's judgment must be an
informed one; one which weighs the alternatives and finds that the need for physical
rehabilitation or additional minority housing at the site in question clearly outweighs
the disadvantage of increasing or perpetuating racial concentration." 436 F.2d at
822.
169. 660 F.2d at 871, 878.
170. The court was reluctant to impose any requirements which would further
delay the construction of low income housing, "a critical factor in this case in light of
the withholding of federal funds." Id. at 874.
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serve the purposes of integration. If the plaintiffs' arguments were
accepted, however, a gentrified community would succeed in imped-
ing the forces of economic and racial integration throughout the city.
The Third Circuit appreciated the irony of the plaintiffs' position
when it noted that "under the guise of their concern about the poor
and minorities, business interests would probably acquire this land,
and the poor and minorities might be forced to live in areas far more
racially concentrated and poverty-stricken. ... 71 The court prop-
erly refused to expand the Shannon doctrine "beyond the limits of its
logic." 7 2
In a concurring opinion,1 73 Judge Adams stated that the issue before
the court should have been limited to whether HUD had abused its
discretion under the Administrative Procedure Act. 7 4 Citing Citizens
to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 175  Judge Adams argued that
HUD's decision should not be set aside without a showing "that HUD
has acted arbitrarily or capriciously, has abused its discretion, or
committed a clear error of judgment . 1.7. 617 The Volpe decision,
however, was cited by Justice Marshall in the dissenting opinion in
Stryker's Bay as standing for the proposition that "the arbitrary or
capricious standard prescribes a 'searching and careful' judicial in-
quiry designed to ensure that the agency has not exercised its discre-
tion in an unreasonable manner." 177 Although the majority opinion
in Stryker's Bay called for a less strict standard, it did so in the context
of a NEPA claim and not pursuant to an action brought under Title
VIII as in University City.
IV. Chicago: Alschuler v. HUD
As in New York 178 and Philadelphia, 79 the placement of low in-
come housing in some of Chicago's more affluent neighborhoods has
171. Id. at 878.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 879-80 (Adams, J., concurring).
174. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976). The Act requires reviewing courts "to hold unlawful
and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to be ... arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. Id.
§ 706(2)(A).
175. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
176. 660 F.2d at 880.
177. Stryker's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 231 (1980)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,
401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971)).
178. See note 5 supra.
179. See notes 126-28 supra and accompanying text.
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often been met with resistance. 0 The courts have found that even
the Chicago Housing Authority, the agency responsible for imple-
menting fair housing programs in the city, has promoted segregation-
ist policies.'l8 Opposition to economic and racial integration con-
tinues today in Chicago's Uptown, where representatives of a
gentrified community seek to enjoin HUD from providing assistance
to an apartment rehabilitation project for low income tenants.182
Chicago's Uptown is a large 8 3 and diverse 18 4 community in need of
low income housing.8 5 A section of the Uptown area has been gentri-
180. See, e.g., Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 436 F.2d 306 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 922 (1971), in which the court approved of deadlines set for the
placement of low income housing in middle class neighborhoods. The court rejected
arguments that plans to promote racially integrated low income housing would result
in "racial tension in the city to the point of strife" and the "acceleration of an already
alarming flight to the suburbs by middle class White families." 436 F.2d at 309.
181. Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (ruling
that Housing Authority had denied entry to blacks in four predominantly white, low
income housing projects because of racial quotas). A line of Gautreaux (name of a
black resident of a housing project in Chicago) cases since the district court's decision
in 1969 illustrates the problems Chicago has had in providing integrated low income
housing. In Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 304 F. Supp. 736 (N.D. Ill. 1969),
aff'd, 436 F.2d 306 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 922 (1971), the courts formu-
lated an affirmative plan to remedy the effects of past discrimination, Gautreaux v.
Romney, 448 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1971), held that HUD's acquiescence to the Chicago
Housing Authority's discriminatory policies violated civil rights laws and the due
process clause of the fifth amendment. In Gautreaux v. Romney, 332 F. Supp. 366
(N.D. Ill. 1971), rev'd, 457 F.2d 124 (7th Cir. 1972), the district court attempted to
enjoin HUD's payment of "model cities" funds to Chicago until the city complied
with fair housing standards, but the court of appeals reversed, holding that the lower
court had abused its discretion. Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 342 F. Supp. 827
(N.D. I11. 1972), afj'd sub nom. Gautreaux v. City of Chicago, 480 F.2d 210 (7th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1144 (1974), required the city to accelerate its
implementation of fair housing programs. In Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 503
F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1974), aff'd sub nom. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976), the
district court's decision not to expand the remedial housing plan beyond Chicago's
city limits to include the greater metropolitan area was rejected on appeal. The most
recent decision, Gautreaux v. Pierce, 524 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Ill. 1981), held that
HUD's final report on Chicago's efforts to comply with fair housing goals was
deficient and that HUD must file a "revised final report."
182. Alschuler v. HUD, 515 F. Supp. 1212, 1215 (N.D. Ill. 1981), appeal dock-
eted, No. 81-1904 (7th Cir. June 9, 1981).
183. Uptown is the largest, in terms of both population and housing units, of
Chicago's 76 communities designated for census purposes. Id. at 1218.
184. One commentator views the area as "a lively multiracial neighborhood, a
new kind of urban melting pot." Schept, The Fight for City Turf, Nat'l L.J., July 13,
1981, at 1, col. 1. Some Uptown residents, however, consider themselves part of
older and smaller neighborhoods within the Uptown area. 515 F. Supp. at 1219,
citing E. WARREN, CHICAGO'S UPTOWN: PUBLIC POLICY, NEIGHBORHOOD DECAY, AND
CITIZEN ACTION IN AN URBAN COMMUNITY 15 (1979).
185. 515 F. Supp. at 1218, 1224.
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fied in recent years as "upper middle class and middle class individ-
uals have moved into the neighborhood, have rehabilitated existing
housing stock and have encouraged new private investment." 8 6 In
1979, a developer responded to a HUD notice of funds availabilitys18 7
and proposed to rehabilitate the Monterey Apartments, two buildings
located inside the gentrified community, 88 with funds provided by
the Section 8 program. 8" Under the proposal, all tenants of the
Monterey Apartments would be eligible for rent subsidies. 90 Al-
though the developer could not state for certain what the racial mix of
the tenants would be, he estimated that one half of the tenants would
be non-white.' 9 ' HUD conducted an extensive review of the devel-
oper's proposal and granted an initial endorsement of the project in
1980.192
A community organization, whose membership consists primarily
of affluent whites9 3 who live in the gentrified area surrounding the
Monterey Apartments, sought to enjoin HUD's funding of the proj-
ect. 9 4 In Alschuler v. HUD,9 5 the plaintiffs'9" argued that HUD's
186. Id. at 1223. The court described the process as "an urban phenomenon that
has come to be known as 'gentrification.' " Id.
187. 24 C.F.R. § 881.102(b) (1981), requires HUD to issue a notice of funds
availability (NOFA) whenever it seeks to solicit bids for a Section 8 rehabilitation
project.
188. One of the buildings was constructed in the 1920's and served as an apart-
ment hotel for transients. The developer plans to convert this building, now vacant,
into an apartment house with 33 one bedroom, 44 two bedroom and 2 three bedroom
apartments. A second and smaller building, also vacant, contains 3 three bedroom
apartments. Thus a total of 82 units are planned for Monterey Apartments. 515 F.
Supp. at 127-18.
189. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (1976 & Supp. III 1979) (authorizes Section 8 rehabili-
tation projects); 24 C.F.R. § 881.101-709 (1981) (regulations applicable to Section 8
rehabilitation projects); notes 144-46, 162 supra on Section 8 generally.
190. 515 F. Supp. at 1218.
191. Id. "The proposed target level for the racial and ethnic integration of the
rehabilitated Monterey buildings: 41 white families, 17 black families, 12 Hispanic
families, 7 Oriental families and 4 American Indian families." Id.
192. Id. at 1224.
193. The organization, the Hutchinson-Hazel-Junior Terrace Association, rep-
resents over 60 families, all of whom are white except for one black member and one
Oriental member. Id. at 1216-17. Most members live in large, single family homes.
Id. at 1217.
194. Id. at 1215.
195. 515 F. Supp. 1212 (N.D. I11. 1981), appeal docketed, No. 81-1904 (7th Cir.
June 9, 1981).
196. Plaintiffs included the Hutchinson-Hazel-Junior Terrace Association, see
note 193 supra, and three of its individual members: Frank Alschuler, Morton
Weisman, and Diane Sokolofski. Id. at 1216-17. The value of the individual plain-
tiffs' homes were estimated to be in the $150,000 to $250,000 range. Id. at 1217.
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provision of housing assistance payments 197 and mortgage insurance198
to the Monterey project would constitute an abuse of discretion within
the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act. 9" They contended
that the project would cause "an undue concentration of assisted
persons" in the Uptown area in violation of HUD's own regulations
under the Section 8 program 200 and create a racially segregated neigh-
borhood in contravention of Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of
1968.201
The court examined HUD's conclusion that no "undue minority
concentrations" would result from the project. 20 2 Using 1970 census
figures, a HUD official had calculated the number of assisted housing
units in tract 321 (the location of the Monterey Apartments), the
immediately surrounding tracts, and the Uptown community as a
whole. 20 3 The official testified that "he would begin to look closely at
the percentage of assisted housing units as it approached 25 % of all
units in an area," 20 4 but that even this percentage was flexible.2 0 5 In
none of the census tracts he examined did the percentage of assisted
housing units exceed eighteen percent. 20 1  Accordingly, the court
agreed with HUD's conclusion that the rehabilitation of the Monterey
Apartments for low income tenants would not cause an undue concen-
tration of assisted persons in the surrounding area. 20 7
197. Housing assistance payments under the Section 8 rehabilitation program, see
42 U.S.C. § 1437f(a) (1976 & Supp. III 1979) and 24 C.F.R. §§ 881.501-.507,(1981),
are comparable to those available under the Section 8 new construction program, see
note 162 supra.
198. Mortgage insurance is available under the National Housing Act of 1934, 12
U.S.C. § 1715e(i) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
199. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976). See notes 96, 174 supra.
200. 24 C.F.R. § 881.206(c) (1981), requires that "[t]he site must promote greater
choice of housing opportunities and avoid undue concentration of assisted persons in
areas containing a high proportion of low-income persons."
201. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). See note 157 supra.
202. 515 F. Supp. at 1230-32.
203. Id. at 1231.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 1221. The official calculated the number of subsidized units as of July
1, 1979 and divided that figure by the total number of housing units as of the 1970
census. Although the 1970 census figures were clearly outdated, the court noted that
because of new construction in the Uptown area during the 1970's, the percentages of
subsidized units were probably higher than actually existed in 1979. Id. at 1231.
207. Id. at 1232. The court never defined the "relevant area" for purposes of
undue concentration, probably because it did not find a high percentage of assisted
housing units in any area near the Monterey Apartments. The court acknowledged
that such definitions are based on "highly subjective judgments" and observed that
"[i]n many instances the court was left with the firm conviction that boundaries of
the relevant area were directly correlated to the witnesses' interest in having this
court decide that relevant statistics would show a greater or lesser concentration of
poor or minority residents." Id. at 1220.
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With respect to the plaintiffs' Title VIII claim, the court again
deferred to HUD's discretion. The court noted that HUD's Fair Hous-
ing Specialist, unlike her counterpart in Philadelphia, 208 had inten-
tionally ignored the racial composition of the local public schools in
determining the concentration of minorities in the area. 20 9 The court
agreed with HUD, however, that such data bore little relation to
actual neighborhood composition, given the tendency of middle class
whites in the vicinity to send their children to private schools. 210
Also, the court observed, HUD had considered several factors apart
from census data before determining that the Monterey project was
permissible in light of HUD's Title VIII responsibilities. 21' First,
HUD had reviewed the developer's "affirmative fair housing market-
ing plan"2 12 and found it in order. 213 HUD's purpose in requiring the
plan of every developer is to ensure that all racial and ethnic groups in
a given area have an opportunity to learn about new subsidized
housing projects. 21 4 Monterey's developer indicated that he would
contact community organizations and advertise in both daily and
ethnic newspapers in order to promote the racial and economic inte-
gration of the project. 21 -5 Second, HUD had established that the
apartments were located in Chicago's "general public housing
area." 216  Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority21 7 defined this
area to include those neighborhoods located more than one mile from
a census tract with a non-white population greater than 30% .218 In
light of all the evidence, the court concluded that HUD had not erred
in finding that the rehabilitation of the Monterey Apartments would
not create a racially segregated neighborhood in contravention of
Title VIII. 219
In denying the plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction, the
court stated that the public interest in providing decent, safe and
sanitary housing for Chicago's low income residents, especially those
displaced from the Uptown area by gentrification, outweighed any
208. See note 152 supra and accompanying text.
209. 515 F. Supp. at 1233.
210. Id. Only one of the more than 60 families belonging to the Hutchinson-
Hazel-Junior Terrace Association had a child attending a Chicago public school.
Id. at 1217.
211. Id. at 1233-34.
212. See 24 C.F.R. § 200.625 (1981).
213. 515 F. Supp. at 1233.
214. Id. at 1234.
215. Id. at 1233.
216. Id. at 1234.
217. 304 F. Supp. 736 (N.D. Ill. 1969), aff'd, 436 F.2d 306 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 922 (1971). See note 181 supra regarding related Gautreaux cases.
218. 304 F. Supp. at 737.
219. 515 F. Supp. at 1234.
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possible injury to the plaintiff. 20 In fact, the court found no reason
to believe that the project would have any adverse impact on the
plaintiffs' community. 221 The court noted that many buildings in the
gentrified neighborhood had already been rehabilitated with some
form of federal aid 222 and observed that the "plaintiffs have expressed
no objection to private and federally subsidized development and
rehabilitation in their immediate neighborhood which is directed at
middle and upper income individuals. ' 223 As to the plaintiffs' fears
that the project would attract criminals and other undesirables,2 24 the
court declined to accept the proposition that the rehabilitation of
apartments for eighty-two low income families would cause the neigh-
borhood to become a ghetto.225
The court could have decided the case solely on the basis of judicial
restraint in review of agency decision-making. 226  Instead, the court
chose to examine the merits of HUD's decision, following the path
chosen by the Third Circuit in University City227 and the district court
in Stryckers' Bay.228 Upon completion of its examination, the court
found "no evidence that HUD committed any error, let alone a clear
error, at any stage of its decision making process. ... 220 Though it
is more important for a court to review HUD decisions where a Title
VIII claim is asserted, this unequivocal conclusion raises an important
question: how often are lawsuits such as these begun with little hope
of success on the merits, but with some expectation of ultimate victory
220. Id. at 1239. The court held that plaintiffs had failed to satisfy any of the
requirements for a preliminary injunction, namely, irreparable harm, likelihood of
success on the merits, a balance of hardships in plaintiffs' favor, and furtherance of
the public interest. Id.
221. Id. at 1227.
222. Id. at 1223. The court did not specify the type of federal aid that most
residents had received, but did mention that one real estate developer who was a
member of the Hutchinson-Hazel-Junior Terrace Association had benefited from
his participation in federal programs. Id.
223. Id. at 1224.
224. Id. at 1227.
225. Id. The court commented that "[g]iven the present strong revitalization of
the Uptown community, it is also unlikely that the completion of the Monterey
rehabilitation project will adversely affect property values or the 'environmental,
recreational, cultural, historical, and aesthetic qualities' of the neighborhood." Id.
226. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415
(1971) (court refused to substitute its judgment for that of an agency); Business Ass'n
of Univ. City v. Landrieu, 660 F.2d 867, 879 (3d Cir. 1981) (Adams, J., concurring)
(only issue in considering HUD's approval of a housing project should be whether
HUD has abused its discretion).
227. See notes 147-77 supra and accompanying text.
228. See notes 63-80 supra and accompanying text.
229. 515 F. Supp. at 1225.
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through intimidation and delay? 23 0  A final verdict in Alschuler
awaits the adjudication of the plaintiffs' appeals.23'
V. Boston: Munoz-Mendoza v. Pierce
The propriety of HUD's discretion in initiating urban development
programs and subsidies has been challenged by Boston residents as it
has been by individuals and community organizations in New York,
Philadelphia and Chicago. Unlike suits brought in the other three
cities, however, Boston has witnessed a legal battle by low income
residents who seek to enjoin the federal funding of development proj-
ects which they argue would result in displacement. Rather than
calling for HUD subsidies or grants to stabilize low income residential
patterns and prevent gentrification,232 in this case the residents of the
South End community of Boston are attempting to block HUD pro-
grams which they believe will cause gentrification.233
The leading Boston area opinion is Aertsen v. Landrieu,234 in which
the First Circuit affirmed an order vacating a temporary injunction
and dismissing an action brought by affluent residents of South End to
enjoin HUD and the Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA) from
developing a low income housing project in the South End. In so
doing, the court held that the South End residents had not established
an abuse of discretion by HUD. 235  A second suit has been brought
recently by low income residents of the South End community claim-
ing that HUD programs will result in displacement and segregation.
The litigation is in its formative stages, with the United States District
Court for the District of Massachusetts having dismissed HUD's mo-
tion for summary judgment in Munoz-Mendoza v. Pierce.236  As the
230. Although HUD is not likely to be intimidated by such actions, private devel-
opers who are named as co-defendants as in Alschuler may be reluctant to provide
low income housing if they run a risk of incurring losses because of delays and
substantial legal fees.
231. Plaintiffs docketed their appeal five days after the district court rendered its
decision on June 4, 1981.
232. In New York, Philadelphia and Chicago, low income residents concerned
with the displacement effect of gentrification, support HUD subsidies for low income
housing. Actions to enjoin HUD efforts were commenced by affluent residents of,
gentrified communities. See notes 50-62 (New York), 147-49 (Philadelphia), and 193-
201 (Chicago) supra and accompanying text.
233. In Boston, low income residents of South End oppose the award of a HUD
urban development action grant because they contend that it will result in displace-
ment. See notes 242-43 infra and accompanying text.
234. 637 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1980).
235. Id. at 24.
236. 520 F. Supp. 180 (D. Mass. 1981).
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federal district court begins to address the merits of the case, the First
Circuit opinion in Aertsen will be of importance, but the factual
difference between the two South End cases must not be overlooked.
It should be noted, further, that the challenges in both cases involve
different federal statutes and regulations.
A. The First Circuit Decision in Aertsen
The plaintiffs in Aertsen, affluent residents of the South End, filed a
complaint in district court against the Secretary of HUD and the
Director of BRA alleging that "HUD had committed funds to finance
a proposed [low income] housing project known as Viviendas La
Victoria (Victoria II) in the South End of Boston without complying
with certain provisions of NEPA and the 1974 Housing Act and regu-
lations thereunder."23 7 Essentially, the complaint sought to enjoin
HUD from financing Victoria II and to restrain BRA from demolish-
ing existing structures in connection with the construction of Victoria
II.
Although the district court temporarily enjoined HUD and BRA
from proceeding with the Victoria II project, HUD's motion to vacate
and dismiss was subsequently granted. 218  On appeal, the First Cir-
cuit considered "the plaintiffs' contentions that HUD's committment
of funds violates subsection (C) and subsection (D) of § 102(2) NEPA
and the preamble of the 1974 Housing Act and HUD regulations
pursuant thereto. ' 2 9  In affirming the district court's order, the cir-
cuit court found that the plaintiffs had not established a violation of
federal regulations or statutes. Relying on both Shannon v. HUD and
Stryker's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, the court deferred to
the judgment of HUD decision makers with regard to the determina-
tion that Victoria II was not a major federal action significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment within the meaning
of NEPA 240 and with regard to the Housing and Community Develop-
237. 637 F.2d 12, 14-15 (1st Cir. 1980).
238. Id. at 17.
239. Id. Section 102(2)(C) of NEPA provides that "to the fullest extent possible:
. (2) all agencies of the Federal Government shall . . . (C) include in . . . major
Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a
detailed statement [EIS] by the responsible official on . . . (i) the environmental
impact of the proposed action." 42 U.S.C. § 4223 (2)(C) (1976). The alleged violation
of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 involved §§ 101 and 104 of
Title I, 42 U.S.C. § 5301 (c)(6) (1976) and 42 U.S.C. § 5304 (a)(4)(C)(ii) (1976),
respectively and the regulation adopted by HUD to effectuate § 104(a)(4)(C)(ii), 24
C.F.R. § 800.112 (1981).
240. 637 F.2d at 19 ("[O]n review of an HUD determination that a proposed
project does not constitute a major action the judicial function is merely to decide
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ment Act requirements that integrated housing be given serious con-
sideration.24' The court of appeals, noting that the South End is an
area of revitalization in which public and private investment is signifi-
cant, with rising income levels and property values, upheld HUD's
finding that the Victoria II project would not cause an "undue con-
centration" of low income persons.
B. The Copley Place Litigation
In Munoz-Mendoza v. Pierce, a low income community organiza-
tion and several individual plaintiffs seek to enjoin the federal funding
of a luxury hotel and convention center complex (Copley Place), to be
constructed at the perimeter of Boston's South End district. 242  They
argue that Copley Place would result in displacement of neighbor-
hood residents and, because minorities are disproportionately found
among low income residents, contend that HUD's award of an Urban
Development Action Grant (UDAG) violates Title VI and Title VIII
of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1968 respectively.
243
whether HUD has followed a permissible procedure and has reached a substantive
conclusion which is not arbitrary.").
241. Id. at 22, citing Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S.
223, 227 (1980) ("We are not authorized to overturn such a 'fully informed and
well-considered decision' even if it is not the decision we 'would have reached had'
we been decision makers at HUD.").
242. 520 F. Supp. at 181.
Copley Place is a $318 million multi-use development which will include a
712-room luxury hotel, a 960-room convention hotel, a retail center, office
space, enclosed parking and 100-150 units of housing, 25 % of which are to
be subsidized. The site for Copley Place is 9.5 acres of vacant land, cleared
... for construction of the Massachusetts Turnpike extension .... All of
the plaintiffs live in neighborhoods close to the project site. The South End
[one of the neighborhoods bordering the project] is a fully integrated
residential area.
Id. at 181-82.
243. Pursuant to legislation effective October 1, 1978, as amended in 1978, 1979,
and 1980, HUD "is authorized to make urban development action grants [UDAG's]
to cities and urban counties which are experiencing severe economic distress to help
stimulate economic development activity needed to aid in economic recovery." 42
U.S.C. § 5318(a) (Supp. 11 1978). UDAG's are available in addition to, and are not
exclusive of, other forms of federal assistance. They are to be made to cities and
urban counties that have "demonstrated results in providing ... equal opportunity
in housing and employment for low- and moderate-income persons and members of
minority groups. 42 U.S.C. § 5318 (Supp. 11 1978). See generally Comment, Urban
Development Action Grants: A Housing-Linked Strategy for Economic Revitaliza-
tion of Depressed Urban Areas, 26 WAYNE L. REV. 1469 (1980). A recent amendment
to corresponding federal regulation, incorporated in 24 C.F.R. § 570.458 (c)(16)
(1981), requires that all applicants for UDAG grants must certify that their proposed
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The plaintiffs' action in federal district court is based primarily on
two interrelated claims that HUD failed to study the displacement
impact of Copley Place on low income and minority residents of
nearby areas, and the increased rents, condominium conversions and
threatened evictions it would engender. 24  Procedurally, they com-
plain of HUD's failure to consider the indirect displacement of low
income and minority residents due to accelerated gentrification which
would occur in neighborhoods surrounding the Copley Place proj-
ect. 245 Substantively, the plaintiffs claim that the UDAG grant would
result in discrimination against the low income, minority group mem-
bers in the surrounding neighborhoods which would be particularly
hard hit by the indirect displacement predicted. 246 Therefore, HUD's
projects comply with Titles VI and VIII of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1968,
respectively, as well as other federal legislation and executive orders prohibiting
discrimination in housing and employment. Moreover, 24 C.F.R. § 570.458(c)(12)
(1981), requires that each application contain information about involuntary dis-
placement of low-income minorities and a description of the applicant's efforts to
minimize such displacement. Relocation opportunities must be provided for dis-
placed persons and businesses.
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 252, codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976), provides: "No person in the United States shall, on the
ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 24 C.F.R. §§ 1.1-1.2 (1981), effectu-
ates Title VI with respect to housing programs receiving federal financial assistance
from HUD. This regulation prohibits discrimination in HUD-financed housing pro-
grams and sets forth the procedures for conducting HUD investigations and hearings
with respect to discriminatory housing practices. HUD has an affirmative duty to
further the national housing policy expressed in Title VI. Blackshear Residents Org.
v. Housing Auth. of Austin, 347 F. Supp. 1138 (W.D. Tex. 1972). Thus, under Title
VI, federally financed public housing may not be constructed in an area of racial
concentration. See Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731, 739 (7th Cir. 1971) (holding
that HUD violated Title VI by knowingly funding a racially discriminatory family
housing program). See also Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 306 (1976) (holding
that such violation warranted a remedy affecting HUD's conduct beyond the bound-
aries of the area in question). For a discussion of Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of
1968 and the regulations enacted pursuant thereto, see note 157 supra.
244. 520 F. Supp. at 183. A third claim identified by the court "is that HUD's
funding of Copley Place was arbitrary and capricious agehcy action, subject to
review and relief .... " Id. at 186. The Administrative Procedure Act provides that a
reviewing court shall "hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and
conclusions found to be-(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or other-
wise not in accordance with law." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976). Rather than ruling on
this claim, the court reserved judgment seeking judicial review because of an ambig-
uous record and the existence of independent claims.
245. 520 F. Supp. at 183. Plaintiffs "seek a procedural remedy which would
mandate the completion of such a displacement study by HUD." Id.
246. Id. Plaintiffs seek relief which will mitigate the effects of indirect discrimina-
tory displacement. Id.
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procedural failure to consider the projects' impact on minority resi-
dents and its substantive decision to undertake the project despite this
impact, constituted a violation of the duties imposed on HUD by Title
VI and Title VIII.
The Copley Place litigation reached the Massachusetts federal dis-
trict court on cross-motions for summary judgment. 247 The court in
Munoz-Mendoza addressed itself to three threshold issues: the applica-
tion of the civil rights duties under Title VI and Title VIII to recipi-
ents of UDAG grants; whether a private right of action under Title VI
against HUD and the city of Boston exists; and whether the plaintiffs
have standing under Title VIII based upon the harm of "indirect
displacement" which was alleged. 248
The court found that sufficient standing had been shown for the
purposes of withstanding the defendants' motion for summary judg-
ment, but cautioned "the plaintiffs [that they] 'must continue to carry
the burden of proof on standing,' " in subsequent motions and at
trial.2 49 Pursuant to First Circuit precedent, the court noted that in
addition to proving HUD's failure to study the indirect displacement
impact of Copley Place on surrounding neighborhoods, the plaintiffs
must tie the failure to a material harm which they will suffer. After
material harm is established the plaintiffs have the burden of proving
causation-"that the increased rents and threatened evictions are
'fairly traceable' to the UDAG funding of Copley Place .... -250 Fi-
nally, it must be shown that the relief requested can redress the harm.
In its consideration of the applicability of Title VI and Title VIII to
UDAG grants, the court found that both civil rights acts impose
affirmative duties on HUD. Title VIII requires that HUD promote
fair housing opportunities which can only be met if it uses an " 'insti-
tutionalized method' to reach an 'informed decision,' based on 'the
relevant racial and socio-economic information' "--the test set forth
in Shannon. 51 In upholding the plaintiffs' private right of action
under Title VI, the court stated that this statute imposes a less affirm-
ative but broader ranging duty than that under Title VIII, "designed
247. Id. at 181.
248. Id. at 182-83.
249. Id. at 183, quoting NAACP v. Harris, 607 F.2d 514, 527 (1st Cir. 1979).
250. Id. at 184. "it is arguable that Copley Place, a $318 million project, would
have been built even without the $18.85 million UDAG, and that the South End's
ongoing gentrification and displacement of low-income minorities would have con-
tinued to accelerate [without federal funding]." Id. Nevertheless, the court held that
"the plaintiffs have sufficiently personalized issues at stake to further litigate the legal
claims presently before the Court." Id.
251. Id. at 185. See note 141 supra and accompanying text.
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to eliminate racial discrimination in all federally assisted programs or
activities. ' 25 2 Specifically, HUD must make a project investigation as
outlined in the Code of Federal Regulations where, as in this case, it is
requested to study the indirect displacement which might result from
the project.25 3
Although the court noted that the defendants may succeed in estab-
lishing the thoroughness and care of the impact study, it found that
the nature and extent of HUD's compliance with civil rights obliga-
tions presented a genuine issue of material fact. Accordingly, the
court declined to grant summary judgment for the defendants or the
plaintiffs.254
In the last paragraph of the opinion, the court acknowledged the
existence of a claim alleging arbitrary or capricious agency action
under the Administrative Procedure Act.2 55 The court reserved judg-
ment, however, citing an incomplete record and the existence of
independent claims. 256  The extent to which the federal courts in
Boston will adhere to the principles articulated by the Supreme Court
in Stryker's Bay remains to be seen.2 57  It is very possible that the
courts will distinguish the judicial restraint called for in Stryker's Bay
and Aertsen based on the important differences between the NEPA
claims asserted in those cases and the Title VI and Title VIII violations
alleged in Munoz-Mendoza.
VI. Conclusion
The class conflict over urban space is not confined to competition in
the marketplace. As gentrification transforms the character of inner-
252. Id.
253. Id. 24 C.F.R. § 1.7(c) (1981) provides that:
The investigation should include, where appropriate, a review of the
pertinent practises and policies of the recipient, the circumstances under
which the possible noncompliance with this Part I occurred, and other
factors relevant to a determination as to whether the recipient has failed to
comply with this part.
254. 520 F. Supp. at 186 ("[f]urther exploration of the facts is necessary, and
[summary] judgment as a matter of law is unwarranted."). Id.
255. 520 F. Supp. at 186 ("The third and final claim of plaintiffs is that HUD's
funding of Copley Place was arbitrary and capricious agency action, subject to
review and relief under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) [1976].").
256. Id. ("Given the ambiguity of the current record, and the existence of the
independent claims, the Court reserves on this claim seeking judicial review.").
257. In Stryker's Bay, the Supreme Court called for judicial restraint and defer-
ence to the exercise of discretion by an administrative agency. Stryker's Bay Neigh-
borhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227-28 (1980).
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city neighborhoods, the courts have concerned themselves with the
plight of the displaced. Thus far the courts have upheld HUD's spon-
sorship or construction of low income housing projects in gentrified
neighborhoods, but in many instances only after undue delays have
resulted.
Judicial restraint in the review of agency decision-making can help
prevent, in appropriate cases, delays caused by protracted litigation.
In Stryker's Bay and Aertsen, for example, courts properly deferred to
HUD's discretion as to what satisfies the essentially procedural re-
quirements of NEPA. Title VI and Title VIII, however, impose obli-
gations on HUD which are of a more substantive nature than those
imposed by NEPA. In cases such as University City, Alschuler and
Munoz-Mendoza, which involve Title VI and Title VIII claims, the
courts must take a closer look at HUD's decision-making process,
which remains tethered to outdated regulations.2 58
In order to protect federal efforts to maintain the integrated char-
acter of inner-city neighborhoods HUD must amend its regulations
regarding the racial and economic integration of housing to deal with
the reality of gentrification. HUD should define what is meant by
"revitalized" or "gentrified" areas and recognize, as one court recently
did, that such areas are ideal settings for racially and economically
integrated housing. 25 9 In this way, it would be less necessary for the
courts to step in and update, by interpretation, regulations formulated
in the context of an earlier phase of the struggle for integrated housing
258. See notes 142-46 supra and accompanying text. No substantial changes to
HUD regulations regarding site selection for new construction or rehabilitated Sec-
tion 8 housing have been made since those adopted in the wake of Shannon and
Otero.
259. Gautreaux v. Landrieu, 523 F. Supp. 665 (N.D. I11. 1981). The court ap-
proved, as amended, a consent decree worked out between plaintiffs (approximately
43,000 black tenants of and applicants for public housing in the Chicago area) and
HUD, designed to deliver to the plaintiff class the relief from racially discriminatory
practices in public housing it has sought during twelve years of litigation. Id. at 667.
See note 181 supra for a discussion of the Gautreaux litigation. Altering the areas in
which public housing could be located in the Chicago area, it reviewed the concept
of revitalizing areas introduced in the consent decree: "[a]reas which have substantial
minority population and are undergoing sufficient redevelopment to justify the as-
sumption that these areas will become more integrated in a relatively short time.
Because these areas are buffer zones . . . with on-going or planned financial reinvest-
ment by private parties, they are considered the most promising neighborhoods for
racial and economic residential integration." Id. at 669. Although the court acknowl-
edged that the concept of a revitalizing area had been criticized for being too
indefinite, it stated that "[t]hose criticisms ignore the fact that ten criteria were
developed and applied in identifying [these areas]." Id. at 671.
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before gentrification became an active force in the nation's inner-city
neighborhoods. 260
260. In addition to the substantive goal of updating HUD regulations, procedural
mechanisms should be considered. One of the most important would be public
participation in the decision-making process. By institutionalizing public input at an
early stage of project development through required public hearings, any resulting
delays would not drive up estimated construction costs. Hearings are already re-
quired when direct displacement will result from urban renewal. Hearings also
should be required when indirect displacement is likely because of gentrification
(that is, the presence of a threat that a substantial net reduction in the supply of
housing for minority and low income persons in the area would flow from project
development).

